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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD and 
STEPHEN WHITEHEAD, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
v. 
LARRY ANDERSON, VARIABLE 
ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants, Case No. 19695 
and 
AMERICAN MOTORS SALES CORPORATION 
and JEEP CORPORATION, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
American Motors Sales Corporation and 
Jeep Corporation 
Appellants American Motors Sales Corporation and 
Jeep Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "AMC/Jeep"), 
respectfully submit this Reply Brief in answer to the new 
matters set forth in the brief of plaintiffs-respondents 
Deborah Whitehead and Stephen Whitehead. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On this appealf AMC/Jeep seeks reversal of the { 
trial court's judgment on the grounds that the trial court 
made incorrect and prejudicial rulings on questions of law 
and with respect to the admissibility of certain evidence.
 ( 
Specifically, AMC/Jeep argued in its opening brief to this 
Court that the trial court erred (a) in permitting plaintiffs 
to introduce irrelevant and inflammatory evidence (App. Br.
 { 
at 26-36); (b) in denying AMC/Jeep's fundamental right to 
cross-examine plaintiffs' witnesses (App. Br. at 36-42); (c) 
in refusing to permit AMC/Jeep to rebut such evidence by , 
excluding substantial portions of AMC/Jeep's own evidence 
(App. Br. at 42-56); (d) in denying AMC/Jeep's motion for 
mistrial based on improper closing arguments by opposing -, 
counsel (App. Br. at 56-59); (e) in refusing to permit appel-
lant Jeep Corporation to amend its answer to include a stat-
ute of limitations defense (App. Br. at 68-73); (f) in refus-
ing to direct a verdict in favor of AMC/Jeep in light of 
their statute of limitations defense (App. Br. at 73-74); and 
(g) in excluding all evidence relating to the presence of and 
plaintiffs' failure to utilize available seat belts. (App. 
Br. at 59-68). 
In their responsive brieff plaintiffs selectively 
address a few of the errors cited by AMC/Jeep but wholly 
ignore others. For examplef AMC/Jeep assigns error to the 
admission by the trial court of three films showing Jeep 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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CJ5sf not Commandos, overturning under artificially induced 
conditions wholly dissimilar to the conditions of plaintiffs' 
accident (App. Br. at 27-31 ) f and a chart purporting to show 
the so-called "roll-over threshold" of a Commando, but which 
wasf in factf based entirely upon information obtained by 
plaintiffs' expert in testing CJ5s. (App. Br. at 32). In 
their responsive brief, however, plaintiffs attempt to jus-
tify admission by the trial court of only one of the three 
films. No mention is made of the other two films or the 
chart erroneously received in evidence by the trial court. 
(Res. Br. at 19-27). 
In defense of the trial court's limitation of 
AMC/Jeep's right to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts, the 
respondents' brief principally argues the volume of cross-
examination permitted without directly addressing the preju-
dicial effect of the specific limitations raised in appel-
lants' brief. Respondents further attempt to distract the 
Court's attention from the substantive errors below by delib-
erately mischaracterizing the tone and intent of appellants' 
brief as a personal attack on the integrity of the presiding 
trial judge. Such, of course, is not the case. The record 
merely reflects that the court below misunderstood the legal 
framework in which this case was presented, the elements of 
plaintiffs' cause of action, plaintiffs' burden of proof, 
AMC/Jeep's defensive theories, the relevance of defendants' 
evidentiary proffers and the complete irrelevance of the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I 
majority of plaintiffs1 expert testimony. (See App. Br. at 
26-27). 
Similarly, in their effort to defend the trial 
court's exclusion of substantially all of AMC/Jeep's demon-
strative evidence, plaintiffs suggest that the exclusions 
constituted "sanctions" imposed by the trial court for al-
leged discovery abuse by AMC/Jeep. As the record clearly 
reflects, however, no motion for sanctions was ever made by 
plaintiffs and none of AMC/Jeep's evidence was excluded for 
that reason. In every instance, AMC/Jeep's evidence was 
excluded based upon the trial court's failure to comprehend 
its relevance. The judgment below must be reversed and the 
case remanded for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRORS ARE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY PRE-TRIAL RULINGS 
Plaintiffs attempt to defend the trial court's 
evidentiary rulings against AMC/Jeep on the ground that such 
rulings are, in fact, "sanctions imposed by the trial court 
as a result of AMC/Jeep's failure to make discovery." (Resp. 
Br. at 11). Plaintiffs' arguments in this regard fail for 
three independent reasons. First, AMC/Jeep responded fully, 
or objected to, all of plaintiffs' discovery requests. 
Second, plaintiffs' discovery did not request from AMC/Jeep 
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information relating to the demonstrative evidence errone-
ously excluded by the trial court. Third, plaintiffs1 never 
moved the trial court to sanction AMC/Jeep nor did the trial 
court ever indicate that it was sanctioning AMC/Jeep for any 
discovery abuse. 
A. Plaintiffs1 Brief Fails to Present 
the Complete History of the Pretrial 
Proceedings in this Case — AMC/Jeep 
Responded to all of Plaintiffs' 
Discovery. 
A comparison of AMC/Jeep's criticism of the trial 
court's evidentiary rulings to plaintiffs' defense of those 
rulings might lead the reader to wonder whether the parties 
are speaking about the same trial. AMC/Jeep's arguments 
regarding the trial court's exclusion of virtually all of 
AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence underscore the relevance of 
such evidence both as rebuttal evidence and to show state-of-
the-art. (Pet. Br. at 52-56). Plaintiffs' arguments in 
defense of the trial court's exclusion of AMC/Jeep's evi-
dence, on the other hand, center on references to certain 
pre-trial proceedings. (Resp. Br. at 5-19, 38-49). So the 
record is crystal clear on this point, the Court should be 
aware that the following portions of the record comprise all 
of the interrogatories, motions and hearings regarding pre-
trial discovery in this case. As is detailed in full below, 
there is nothing in these pleadings and transcripts which 
supports plaintiffs' charge that the trial court's erroneous 
evidentiary rulings are supported by pre-trial activity in 
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( 
this case: (1) Plaintiffs' first set of interrogatories -
March 4, 1981 (R. 128); (2) Plaintiffs' motion to compel 
answers to interrogatories - July 6, 1981 (R. 134); (3) 
American Motors' answers to interrogatories - July 20f 1981 
(R. 216); (4) American Motors opposition to plaintiffs' 
motion to compel - July 21f 1981 (R. 236); (5) plaintiffs' 
second set of interrogatories - September 15f 1981, (R. 246, 
256); (6) plaintiffs' motion to compel, referring to first 
set of interrogatories already answered by American Motors -
November 12, 1981 (R. 257); (7) plaintiffs' motion to compel, 
referring to second set of interrogatories - August 4, 1982 
(R. 588); (8) AMC/Jeep's answers to second set of inter-
rogatories - August 13, 1982 (R. 614); (9) plaintiffs' motion 
to strike or to compel - August 20, 1982 (R. 641); (10) 
AMC/Jeep's memorandum opposing motion to compel or strike -
September 14, 1982; (11) hearing before Judge Sorenson (T., 
10/29/82, at 1-49; R. 5006-5055); (12) hearing before Judge 
Sorenson (T., 12/29/82, at 1-16; R. 5056-5072); (13) 
AMC/Jeep's supplemental answers to interrogatories - January 
25, 1983 (R. 755); (14) plaintiffs' motion in limine -
October 7, 1983 (R. 1063); (15) minute entry regarding motion 
in limine - October 7, 1983 (R. 1365); (16) transcript of 
trial court's consideration of motion in limine, October 27, 
1983 (T., 10/27/83, at 1555-1576; R. 3337-3358). 
Plaintiffs' recount of the pre-trial proceedings in 
this case is as incomplete as it is misleading. For example, 
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plaintiffs fail to mention the pleadings numbered (2), (4), 
and (13) above. The complete chronological recapitulation of 
those proceedings that follows reveals an utter lack of 
foundation for any "sanction," let alone a purported 
"sanction" of the devastating magnitude that resulted from 
the trial court's erroneous evidentiary rulings. 
Plaintiffs filed and served their first set of 
interrogatories to American Motors Corporation and Jeep 
Corporation on or about March 4, 1981. (R. 128). Plaintiffs 
moved to compel answers to this set of interrogatories on 
July 6, 1981. (R. 134). Plaintiffs1 neglect to point out to 
this Court that American Motors provided timely answers and 
objections to this set of interrogatories on July 20, 1981. 
(R. 216-233). This response was complete, comprising more 
than 15 pages. Plaintiffs also fail to note that American 
Motors responded fully to their motion to compel on July 21, 
1981. (R. 236). 
Plaintiffs served their second set of interrog-
atories on American Motors Corporation and Jeep Corporation 
on September 15, 1981. (R. 246, 256). Plaintiffs next filed 
a Motion for Order Compelling Discovery on November 12, 1981. 
(R. 257). However, as the memorandum accompanying that 
motion makes clear, plaintiffs1 motion is directed entirely 
to American Motors1 answers to plaintiffs1 first set of 
interrogatories. (R. 259-265). This first set of inter-
rogatories had already been answered by American Motors. 
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i 
Plaintiffs did nothing with respect to its dis-
covery of AMC/Jeep's information for the next seven months. i 
On August 4, 1982f howeverf plaintiffs filed a pleading 
styled "Third Motion for Order Compelling Discovery." (R. 
588). Here, for the first (not the third) time, plaintiffs i 
moved the trial court to compel answers to plaintiffs1 second 
set of interrogatories served on September 15, 1981. 
AMC/Jeep responded by filing complete answers and objections < 
to this set of interrogatories on August 13, 1982. (R. 614-
636). Once again, AMC/Jeep's response was extensive, com-
prising some 21 pages. Included in this response was a list ( 
of 240 different drawings, blueprints and plans relating to 
the design and development of the Commando. (R. 632-635). 
These drawings, blueprints and plans were made available to ' 
plaintiffs and were completely responsive to plaintiffs' 
interrogatories. 
Plaintiffs next tactic, on August 20, 1982, was to 
move to strike AMC/Jeep's answers to both sets of inter-
rogatories or, in the alternative, to compel. (R. 641-642). 
AMC/Jeep filed a memorandum opposing plaintiff's motion on 
September 14, 1982. (R. 671-642). In that memorandum, 
AMC/Jeep explained that many of plaintiffs' interrogatories 
were not answerable by AMC/Jeep due to the fact that the 
Commando vehicle at issue in this lawsuit was designed prior 
to 1966 by a predecessor corporation and that many records 
were either difficult to locate or no longer in existence. 
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AMC/Jeep offered to allow plaintiffs' counsel to depose any 
of its personnel who might have relevant knowledge. That 
offer was never acted on by plaintiffs. 
At this stage of the pre-trial proceedings, 
AMC/Jeep emerges as anything but the recalcitrant litigant 
portrayed in plaintiffs' brief. Rather, AMC/Jeep had re-
sponded to all pending discovery and had responded fully to 
plaintiffs' charges that those answers were inadequate. 
B. Plaintiffs' Interrogatories did not 
Request Information Bearing on the 
Demonstrative Evidence Erroneously 
Excluded by the Trial Court. 
Despite the fact that AMC/Jeep had responded fully 
to their interrogatories and motions, and despite the fact 
that AMC/Jeep had offered to permit plaintiffs to interrogate 
AMC/Jeep personnel to amplify such responses, plaintiffs 
brought their complaints about AMC/Jeep's responses before 
the trial court. Judge Sorenson presiding, on October 29, 
1982. At that hearing, the trial court, in an effort "to cut 
the Gordian knot in this case right now," (T., 10/29/82, at 
4; R. 5010), commenced reading the disputed interrogatories 
one by one. (IcL, at 9-49; R. 5015-5055). Despite plain-
tiffs' dramatic assertions to the contrary, (see Resp. Br. at 
5-19), the net effect of Judge Sorenson's exercise is ex-
tremely difficult to determine. As Judge Sorenson himself 
noted during the course of this hearing: "We are making a 
terrible record here, a dreadful record. I wouldn't want to 
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{ 
be arguing it right as of now before an appellate court." 
(1(3. , at 38; R. 5044).
 { 
Plaintiffs1 contentions at the hearing centered 
on their alleged inability to obtain from AMC/Jeep certain 
information regarding the design and development of the 1972 { 
Jeep Commando. Plaintiffs never requested information either 
with respect to Jeep CJ5 vehicles or with respect to films or 
tests of other vehicles or even with respect to films or < 
tests prepared after 1972. Judge Sorenson comprehended fully 
the limited scope of plaintiffs1 interrogatories and 
restricted his observations on many of the interrogatories as i 
follows: 
I will have you give them all available 
information or reasonably retrievable 
information as regards the 1972 model < 
[Commando] only. Now that is all I can 
do Mr. Howard. 
(Id., at 12; R. 5018; see also Ld., at 13-15; R. 5019-5021). 
Judge Sorenson's limitation of his comments to "the 1972 
[Commando] model only" is critical. Judge Sorenson recog-
nized, and plaintiffs1 arguments to Judge Sorenson empha-
sized, that plaintiffs' interrogatories sought only informa-
tion regarding the design and development of the 1972 
Commando. 
The AMC/Jeep evidence which would later be excluded 
by Judge Bullock was not responsive either to the letter of 
plaintiffs1 interrogatories or to the spirit of those inter-
rogatories as interpreted by Judge Sorenson. As amplified in 
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AMC/Jeep's Brief, Judge Bullock excluded the following evi-
dence proffered by AMC/Jeep, none of which relates to the 
design and development of the 1972 Commando: (1) a 1983 film 
showing a 1979 model Jeep CJ5 undergoing emergency maneuvers 
and remaining upright (T., 10/27/83, at 1557, 1559, 1563-
1566, 1570-1571; R. 3339, 3341, 3345-3348, 3352-3353); (2) a 
film showing six non-Jeep vehicles (a 1977 Datsun B-210 
passenger car, a 1978 Toyota Corolla passenger car, a 1979 
Chevrolet Chevette passenger car, a 1980 Toyota 4-wheel-drive 
pickup, a 1981 Ford Bronco utility vehicle, and a 1982 Datsun 
4-wheel-drive pickup) with different centers of gravity than 
the Commando, showing that they all roll over under the same 
maneuvers depicted in plaintiffs' experts' films (I_d., at 
1571-1572; R. 3353-3354; T. 10/28/83, at 1745-1746; R. 3528-
3529); (3) a film showing exemplar vehicles — a Commando and 
an Oldsmobile similar to the automobile driven by defendant 
Larry Anderson which struck plaintiffs Commando from the rear 
— undergoing certain tests intended to simulate plaintiffs' 
accident (T., 10/31/83, 1937-1938; R. 3724-3725); (4) a 
series of photographs depicting human beings in an exemplar 
vehicle in positions similar to those plaintiffs found them-
selves in during the course of their accident (iQ., at 1962-
1967; R. 3749-3754); (5) a film demonstrating occupant move-
ment and damage during rollover (i^ d., at 1985; R. 3773); (6) 
an exhibit demonstrating the fact that the accident vehicle 
had been involved in a prior accident (id,, at 2024-2026; R. 
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3812-3814); and (7) a film showing an exemplar vehicle, a 
Commando, undergoing certain tests and maneuvers with outrig-
gers attached (.id., at 1973; R. 3774). None of this evidence 
excluded by the trial court was responsive to plaintiffs1 
interrogatories, because none of this evidence related to the 
design and development of the 1972 Commando. In fact, much 
of it was relevant primarily as rebuttal evidence to issues 
raised by plaintiffs1 presentation of their case-in-chief. 
Most certainly, plaintiffs have identified no interrogatory 
and no statement by Judge Sorenson which would have required 
AMC/Jeep to produce these films, charts and photographs to 
plaintiffs prior to trial. 
C. Plaintiffs Never Moved for, nor did 
the Trial Court Impose, any Sanctions 
Against AMC/Jeep. 
Judge Sorenson continued his recitation of plain-
tiffs' second set of interrogatories on December 29, 1982. 
At this point, plaintiffs' counsel asked Judge Sorenson for 
sanctions based on an asserted failure by AMC/Jeep to comply 
with plaintiffs' versions of what had occurred at the October 
29 hearing. (T., 12/29/82, at 3-6; R. 5059-5062). Judge 
Sorenson stated: "All right, I will entertain your request 
for sanctions if you will follow the rules." (16^., at 6; R. 
5062). Plaintiffs responded that they "will make an ap-
propriate motion for sanctions." (Id_., at 7; R. 5063). No 
such motion was ever filed by plaintiffs and no ruling con-
cerning sanctions was ever made by the trial court in this 
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case. Judge Sorenson continued through plaintiffs1 second 
set of interrogatories, commenting along the way on the 
opaqueness of plaintiffs1 language: 
I am going to make an observation as an 
attorney, Mr. Johnson [plaintiffs1 
counsel], not as a Judge: The English 
language can be extremely treacherous, 
and some of these interrogatories — this 
is merely my observation as a student of 
the language of the law — are not well 
phrased in my opinion as a lawyer, not as 
a Judge. 
.... 
There is an absence of specificity in 
these interrogatories generally. 
(Ld., at 10, 12; R. 5066, 5068). In this respect, Judge 
Sorenson qualified many of his comments in the following 
fashion: "I will grant you permission to seek the informa-
tion you seek by interrogatory number twenty seven after you 
have clarified precisely what it is you are asking." (Id., 
at 11; R. 5067; see also icL, at 12; R. 5068). No such 
clarification was ever attempted by plaintiffs. 
In short, the net result of Judge Sorenson's exer-
cise, as outlined above, was to prod both parties into con-
cluding discovery in this case in a reasonable manner. The 
trial court criticized the lack of clarity in plaintiffs' 
interrogatories and directed them to clarify the interrog-
atories before AMC/Jeep would be required to answer many of 
them. AMC/Jeep was directed to provide such answers as were 
available to those interrogatories that were capable of being 
understood. Most importantly, however, and as noted above 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 
but totally ignored in plaintiffs1 Brief, Judge Sorenson 
contemplated that a formal motion for sanctions would have to < 
be filed by plaintiffs in the event plaintiffs wished to 
claim that AMC/Jeep thereafter failed to respond in good 
faith to the court's comments and suggestions. The court's < 
minute entry in this regard is clear: "The court will enter-
tain plaintiff's request for sanctions providing Mr. Johnson 
follows the rules of practice." (R. 729). Judge Sorenson < 
could hardly have been more precise in stating that his 
comments and suggestions, standing alone, would not form the 
basis for sanctions; a motion for sanctions would be re- ( 
quired. No such motion was ever filed by plaintiffs. It 
strains credulity, therefore, for plaintiffs to defend the 
trial court's challenged rulings on AMC/Jeep's evidence based < 
on Judge Sorenson's comments. 
Although plaintiffs never filed their promised 
motion for sanctions, AMC/Jeep did file "Supplemental Answers < 
and Objections to Certain of Plaintiffs' Interrogatories" on 
January 25, 1983. (R. 755). These answers represent 
AMC/Jeep's response to Judge Sorenson's suggestions and 
comments. Plaintiffs fail to note in their Brief that 
AMC/Jeep in fact responded to Judge Sorenson's suggestions 
and comments in this manner. AMC/Jeep's supplemental answers 
were never objected to by plaintiffs and no motion to compel 
with respect to them was ever filed by plaintiffs. 
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D. The Trial Court did not Base its 
Exclusion of AMC/Jeep's Evidence on 
Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Plaintiffs1 Motion in Limine, seeking to prevent 
AMC/Jeep from presenting certain evidence, was first con-
sidered by the trial court on the same day it was filed, 
October 7f 1983. The Motion contained no reference either to 
Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or to sanctions. 
The trial court's minute entry for this hearing reflects only 
the following: 
Mr. Howard made a motion for Jeep to be 
prevented from raising matters which they 
failed to respond to in their answers to 
interrogatories. Matter discussed at 
length between Court and counsel. The 
Court ruled defendant may cross examine, 
but is not to bring up new facts which 
were not given plaintiff's counsel in 
their response to interrogatories; how-
ever, if some facts are used and defen-
dant's witness makes a different conclu-
sion, those opinions would be admissible. 
(R. 1365). This synopsis of the day's discussion contains no 
hint as to the sweeping evidentiary rulings to be made in the 
future by the trial court with respect to AMC/Jeep's cross-
examination and evidence. It states only that AMC/Jeep was 
"not to bring up new facts which were not given plaintiffs' 
counsel in their response to interrogatories." It does not 
state that AMC/Jeep would be precluded from presenting evi-
dence never requested in plaintiffs' interrogatories. Nor 
does it indicate that AMC/Jeep had failed to respond to 
plaintiffs' interrogatories. Moreover, the last clause 
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quoted above runs directly contrary to the trial court's 
blockage of AMC/Jeep's legitimate efforts to cross-examine 
plaintiffs' experts. (See App. Br. at 36-42). Most impor-
tantly, there is absolutely no indication that the trial 
court's statements were based in any way on Judge Sorenson's 
prior hearings, or that the trial court intended to 
"sanction" AMC/Jeep. 
The trial judge's sole intimation of reliance on 
Judge Sorenson's pre-trial rulings is found in connection 
with plaintiffs' presentation of their Motion in Limine, in 
chambers, on October 27, 1983. (T., 10/27/83, at 1555-1576; 
R. 3337-3358). The trial judge heard plaintiffs' version of 
Judge Sorenson's hearings and excluded one of AMC/Jeep's 
films on the ground that "Plaintiffs were entitled to have, 
or to see, the films and test results before the trial pur-
suant to their discovery interrogatories." (I<5., at 1571; R. 
3353). A careful review of the record reveals clearly, 
however, that this film bore absolutely no relation to any of 
plaintiffs' interrogatories. It was a film made in 1983 of a 
Jeep CJ5 and had nothing to do with the 1972 Commando. In 
fact, the film was not even prepared by AMC/Jeep. (ld_., at 
1557-1558; R. 3339-3340). Plaintiffs' interrogatories never 
inquired either into testing of CJ5's or into testing that 
occurred in 1983. When counsel for AMC/Jeep protested that 
the trial judge had misapprehended Judge Sorenson's intent, 
the trial judge clarified his ruling, stating: "My ruling 
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was based not only on that, but on what I consider to be the 
Rules of Civil Procedure." (Id., at 1574; R. 3356). Thus, 
even in this single instance when the trial judge referred to 
Judge Sorenson's pre-trial hearings, it is not at all clear 
that the trial judge intended to rely on those hearings to 
support his exclusion of AMC/Jeep evidence. It is absolutely 
clear, however, that even if the trial judge intended to rely 
on such hearings, the film excluded by the trial judge on 
this occasion was not within the scope of any interrogatory 
propounded by plaintiffs to AMC/Jeep. 
A review of the trial judge's evidentiary rulings 
throughout the trial reveals that such rulings were based on 
his view of the relevance of AMC/Jeepfs evidence and cross-
examination, not on the transcript of the hearings before 
Judge Sorenson. The trial judge never related his systematic 
exclusion of AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence to any inter-
rogatory or interrogatories; in fact, such relation was 
impossible because plaintiffs1 interrogatories did not relate 
to the AMC/Jeep evidence excluded by the trial judge. More-
over, as is amplified in the preceding pages of this Brief, 
if the trial judge intended to sanction AMC/Jeep by excluding 
evidence crucial to the defense of this lawsuit, plaintiffs 
should have, at the least, been required to file a Motion for 
Sanctions to which AMC/Jeep could have responded. Hercules 
Drayage Company, Inc. v. Canco Leasing Corp., 24 Ariz. App. 
598, 540 P.2d 724, 726 (1975) ("Our interpretation of Rule 37 
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would require that the party wishing to avail itself of the 
sanctions for failure of discovery must move the court for an ( 
order sanctioning the alleged uncooperative party.") 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS' ATTEMPTED DEFENSE OF THE I 
TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY RULINGS IS 
UNAVAILING 
The bulk of plaintiffs' Brief is consumed with the 
effort to single out and defend individually several of the < 
trial court's erroneous evidentiary rulings detailed in 
AMC/Jeep's Brief. (Resp. Br. at 19-38). Any one of the 
trial court's errors, standing alonef would justify reversal 
of the judgment on the verdict. Plaintiffs' attempt to 
focus, point by point, on a few selected rulings out of the 
many challenged by AMC/Jeep does not blunt the thrust of 
AMC/Jeep's argument that the cumulative effect of the trial 
court's evidentiary rulings — its admission of plaintiffs' 
irrelevant and inflammatory evidence, combined with its 
blockage of AMC/Jeeps's efforts to cross-examine plaintiffs' 
expertsf combined with its exclusion of substantial portions 
of AMC/Jeep's evidence — requires that the trial court's 
judgment on the verdict be reversed. The flaws inherent in 
plaintiffs' particular points are set out below. 
A. The Dynamic Science Film was Irrel-
evant and Unduly Prejudicial and 
Should Have Been Excluded 
Plaintiffs discuss at length the admissibility of 
the so-called Dynamic Science film. (Resp. Br. at 19-27). 
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This discussion is in apparent response to Point I of 
AMC/Jeep's Brief wherein this film, along with two other 
films introduced by plaintiffs and one of plaintiffs' ex-
pert's charts, are shown to be irrelevant to the issues of 
this lawsuit. (App. Br. at 26-36). Plaintiffs' decision to 
defend only one of the several demonstrative films and ex-
hibits challenged in AMC/Jeep's Brief is not explained in 
plaintiffs' Brief, but in any event AMC/Jeep's challenge to 
the receipt in evidence of the other two films is not dis-
puted by plaintiffs. 
Turning to the Dynamic Science film, it will be 
recalled that AMC/Jeep's objection to this film and virtually 
all of plaintiffs' demonstrative evidence and expert tes-
timony centered on its lack of relevance to the only issues 
in plaintiffs' case against AMC/Jeep: (a) whether the plain-
tiffs' 1972 Commando was defectively designed and unreason-
ably dangerous when it left the hands of the manufacturer 
because it rolled over when struck from behind, on an inter-
state highway, by a vehicle traveling approximately 70 miles 
per hour, and (b) whether the alleged design defect was a 
proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. Rather than bearing 
on the above issues, the Dynamic Science film shifted the 
focus of this case away from plaintiffs' accident towards a 
rambling investigation of Jeep vehicles, not Commandos, in 
general. As plaintiffs' own witness candidly explained, the 
"defect" presented to the trial court and jury by plaintiffs 
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"may not have anything to do with this particular accident." 
(T., 10/25/83, at 934; R. 2714). 
The Dynamic Science film defended in plaintiffs' 
Brief is perhaps the best example of the irrelevant and 
inflammatory nature of plaintiffs1 evidence. The film's lack 
of relevance is detailed at pages 28-29 of AMC/Jeep's opening 
Brief. Suffice it to note here that the film showed Jeep 
CJ5's, not Commandos, and was explained by an expert who had 
never tested a Commando. More importantly, the maneuvers 
depicted in the film were never shown to bear any relation-
ship to the circumstances of plaintiffs' accident. Simi-
larly, the movement of the anthropomorphic dummies seated in 
the CJ5 was never shown to bear any resemblance to plain-
tiffs' movement during the course of their accident. 
Plaintiffs' statement in their Brief that "Mr. 
Noettl testified that the CJ-5 on the film demonstrated 
handling reactions substantially similar to the manner in 
which the Jeep Commando would respond under circumstances and 
conditions prevalent in this accident," (Resp. Br. at 20), is 
a misstatement of the record. Mr. Noettl never offered such 
testimony. In fact, Mr. Noettl could make no such statement 
because he had never tested a Commando nor had he recon-
structed plaintiffs' accident. (T., 10/26/83, at 1182; R. 
2907). Mr. Noettl was utilized by plaintiffs primarily to 
testify that "Jeeps," as a generic class of vehicles, are 
easier to overturn than a "passenger car." Id. at 1262; R. 
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3039). Plainly, Mr. Noettl was incompetent to render the 
Dynamic Science film relevant to the issues in this case. 
Plaintiffs also state that Mr. Noettl testified 
that "the tests that were appropriate for conditions basi-
cally similar to that giving rise to this litigation were the 
J Turn and the obstacle avoidance maneuver [depicted in the 
film]. (R. 2972)." (Resp. Br. at 21). A review of the 
record cited by plaintiffs for this statement reveals that 
Mr. Noettl is referring to the tests shown in the film but in 
no way relates those tests to plaintiffs1 accident. Here, as 
throughout his testimony, Mr. Noettl assumes the role of one 
testifying to a legislative or administrative committee about 
the characteristics of off-road vehicles in general. His 
testimony, and the film he utilized to illustrate that tes-
timony, are not relevant to the issues in this lawsuit. 
Contrary to the insistence of plaintiffs that Mr. Noettl 
"testified that the film was material, for it demonstrated 
the rollover threshold of the Jeep Commando under circum-
stances similar to that which occurred on the day and place 
of the accident," (Resp. Br. at 21-22), plaintiffs are unable 
to cite any place in the record where such a foundation was 
laid. In fact, plaintiffs' counsel went so far as to stipu-
late that the film did not simulate the conditions prevailing 
at the time of the accident. (T., 10/26/83, at 1207; R. 
2984). 
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Plaintiffs respond inadequately to AMC/Jeep's 
argument that plaintiffs' experts' films should have been { 
excluded because they lacked "a foundational showing ... that 
the tests were conducted under conditions substantially 
similar to actual conditions." Collins v. B.F. Goodrich Co.y < 
558 F.2d 908f 910 (8th Cir. 1977). Plaintiffs' Brief simply 
ignores the established rule which places "the burden ... 
upon the party offering evidence of out-of-court experiments 
... to lay a proper foundation demonstrating a similarity of 
circumstances and conditions." Barnes v. General Motors 
Corp., 547 F.2d 275f 277 (5th Cir. 1977). Plaintiffs' at-
tempt to distinguish Haynes v. American Motors Corporationf 
691 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1982), is simply disingenuous. The 
trial court in Haynes ruled that a commercial film showing a 
Jeep CJ5 in off-road situations was irrelevant and inadmis-
sible because neither the vehicle depicted nor the maneuvers 
illustrated in the film bore any relation to the plaintiffs' 
vehicle or circumstances. The case is directly on point and 
underscores the trial court's evidentiary errors below. 
B. Plaintiffs Fail to Justify the Trial 
Court's Erroneous Limitation of 
AMC/Jeep's Cross-Examination of 
Plaintiffs' Experts 
AMC/Jeep's opening Brief details, with full cita-
tion to the record, the trial court's blockage of AMC/Jeep's 
efforts to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts on their crucial 
opinion that "Jeeps," as a class of vehicles, overturned much 
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more readily than other vehicles and that non-Jeep vehicles 
would not have overturned under the circumstances of plain-
tiffs' accident. (App. Br. at 36-42). (See T., 10/25/83, at 
1001-1005, 1018; R. 2780-2784, 2797; T., 10/26/83, at 1266, 
1275; R. 3043, 3052). 
Plaintiffs' respond to AMC/Jeep's argument by 
defending the trial court's "position in legal circles and 
his prominence among his colleagues, both before and after 
appointment to the bench ...." (Resp. Br. at 27-28). Counsel 
for AMC/Jeep certainly do not disagree with plaintiffs' 
assessment of the trial court's reputation, but it is facts 
and law, not gratuitous reference to the trial court's 
reputation and ability, which must govern the outcome of this 
appeal. 
Plaintiffs intimate that their experts' comparison 
of "Jeeps" to other vehicles was not elicited on direct 
examination by plaintiffs' counsel and that the trial court's 
blockage of AMC/Jeep's cross-examination on this point was 
proper. (Resp. Br. at 32). Quite contrary to plaintiffs' 
suggestion, plaintiffs' experts rendered their opinion that 
"Jeeps" compared unfavorably to "other vehicles" under direct 
examination by plaintiffs' counsel. (T., 10/20/83, at 558-
560; R. 2331-2333 [direct examination by Mr. Howard]; T., 
10/25/83, at 896-897; R. 2676 [direct examination by Mr. 
Howard]). 
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Plaintiffs next attempt to confuse the issue by 
noting that AMC/Jeep was, indeed, allowed to voir dire and 
cross-examine their witnesses on several topics. (Resp. Br. 
at 28-35). What plaintiffs neglect to point out is that the 
pages of the record to which they cite involve voir dire and 
cross-examination on issues wholly unrelated to the critical 
opinion offered by these experts that a "Jeep" overturns in 
circumstances in which "some other car" would not have over-
turned. 
The entire point of AMC/Jeep1s argument in this 
regard, that plaintiffs' experts were permitted to compare 
"Jeeps" to other vehicles but that AMC/Jeep was blocked from 
cross-examining on this point, is utterly ignored in plain-
tiffs argument. Similarly, plaintiffs never address the 
documented charge of AMC/Jeep that "[t]he practical effect of 
the trial court's restriction of appellants' right of cross-
examination was to allow plaintiffs' theory of the case to go 
unchallenged. Plaintiffs' experts were allowed to testify 
repeatedly and without foundation that 'Jeeps' performed 
poorly in comparison to other vehicles, yet AMC/Jeep was 
prohibited from exploring the basis for that comparison." 
(App. Br. at 39). 
C. The Trial Court's Exclusion of Vir-
tually All of Plaintiffs' Demon-
strative Evidence is Plain Error 
AMC/Jeep has detailed the trial court's exclusion 
of AMC/Jeep's evidence which would have demonstrated that the 
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tests depicted in plaintiffs' films bore no relation to 
emergency driving conditions and that "Jeeps" in general and 
Commandos in particular are reasonably stable vehicles which 
can successfully negotiate realistic emergency situations. 
(App. Br. at 42-56). 
Plaintiffs respond to AMC/Jeeps contentions by 
shifting focus, once again, from the facts and the law. 
Plaintiffs' charge that AMC/Jeep has charged the trial court 
with "incompetence and corruption". (Resp. Br. at 39). 
Suffice it to say that such arguments are as unfounded as 
they are gratuitous. 
Plaintiffs next rehash their argument concerning 
the pre-trial proceedings in this case. The full and undeni-
able fallaciousness of plaintiffs' argument in this regard is 
revealed by their statement that the subject of the film 
offered by AMC/Jeep's expert, Mr. Heitzman, had been "prev-
iously specifically barred" by Judge Sorenson. (Resp. Br. at 
40). Judge Sorenson never did any such thing. 
First, the film at issue would have been utilized 
by Mr. Heitzman to illustrate his opinion concerning the 
handling qualities of the CJ5. The film was plainly relevant 
because the CJ5 had been much maligned by plaintiffs' experts 
and plaintiffs had presented to the jury the notion that the 
CJ5 and plaintiffs' Commando were identical. Plaintiffs can 
point to no interrogatory reviewed by Judge Sorenson which 
requests any information concerning the CJ5. Second, as has 
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been previously made clear, Judge Sorenson stated explicitly 
to plaintiffs that a motion for sanctions would have to be { 
filed before the trial court would consider imposing any 
sanctions. No such motion was ever filed, either before 
Judge Sorenson or before the trial judge. Once again, plain- i 
tiffs make no attempt to defend the actual basis for the 
trial judge's exclusion of AMC/Jeep's evidence; the erroneous 
belief that such evidence was irrelevant. 
It must be noted that plaintiffs make no attempt 
whatsoever to defend the trial court's exclusion of Mr. 
Heitzman's film showing vehicles with "outriggers" attached 
undergoing certain maneuvers. (See App. Br. at 44-47). This 
film was essential to demonstrate not only that plaintiffs' 
film of a Commando equipped with outriggers was misleading, 
but also that many vehicles besides "Jeeps" will roll over 
under the conditions depicted in plaintiffs' films. 
Plaintiffs next argue that AMC/Jeep is precluded 
from challenging the trial court's exclusion of AMC/Jeep's 
demonstrative evidence because "[m]atters not admitted in 
evidence before the trier of fact will not be considered on 
appeal before the Supreme Court." (Resp. Br. at 45, quoting 
Pilcher v. State Dept. of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450, 453 
(Utah 1983)). Pilcher has nothing to do with AMC/Jeep's 
challenges to the trial court's evidentiary rulings in this 
case. The errors cited by AMC/Jeep were carefully preserved 
through proffers reflected in the record before this Court. 
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Plaintiffs next defend the trial court's exclusion 
of two films offered to demonstrate the testimony of 
AMC/Jeep's expert Dr. Warner. The first of these films would 
have demonstrated the weaknesses in plaintiffs' experts' 
opinion that "Jeeps" overturn more easily than other ve-
hicles. The second film was of an exemplar Commando equipped 
with outriggersf showing that the Commando is a stable ve-
hicle. (See App. Br. at 47-49). Plaintiffs attempt to 
defend the exclusion of these two manifestly relevant films 
with the blithe comment that they were "rejected for the same 
reasons applicable to the Heitzman film." (Resp. Br. at 45-
46). Once again, plaintiffs raise the issue of Judge 
Sorenson's 1982 hearings, but no substance is provided by 
plaintiffs to support their argument. 
As with plaintiffs' argument concerning the ir-
relevant evidence admitted by the trial court over AMC/Jeep's 
objections, plaintiffs fail to address all of AMC/Jeep's 
claims of error in the trial court's exclusion of AMC/Jeep's 
evidence. Besides the films referred to above, the trial 
court also excluded erroneously a series of photographs 
offered to demonstrate Dr. Warner's testimony. Plaintiffs do 
not attempt to defend this action. 
Finally, plaintiffs simply ignore AMC/Jeep's argu-
ments that AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence should have been 
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admitted to rebut plaintiffs' irrelevant evidence. (App. Br. 
at 50-56). Although it can be surmised that plaintiffs j 
disagree with the cases and authorities cited by AMC/Jeepf it 
is clear that plaintiffs have left AMC/Jeep and this Court no 
hint as to the basis for such disagreement. \ 
POINT III 
CLOSING ARGUMENTS MADE BY OPPOSING 
COUNSEL WERE IMPROPER AND CONSTITUTED 
GROUNDS FOR A MISTRIAL 
AMC/Jeep has detailed the gross misstatements made 
to the jury by opposing counsel during closing arguments. 
(App. Br. at 56-59). Despite the fact that AMC/Jeep had 
offered demonstrative evidence to rebut the testimony of 
plaintiffs' expertsf and such evidence was kept from the jury 
2 by the trial court, counsel for defendant Larry Anderson 
Plaintiffs make a two sentence attempt to distinguish one 
of the many cases cited by AMC/Jeep for its argument that its 
demonstrative evidence was relevant to rebut the opinions of 
plaintiffs1 experts. Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, the 
court in Walker v. Trico Manufacturing Co., Inc., 487 F. 2d 
595 (7th Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974), did 
not decide the issue whether state-of-the-art evidence is 
relevant to the defense of a strict products liability 
action. Rather, as is clear on page 600 of the opinion, the 
court held that even if state-of-the-art evidence, standing 
alone, was not relevant in the defense of such actions, such 
evidence should be permitted to rebut the plaintiff's intro-
duction of similar evidence. 
2 
At page 20 of AMC/Jeep's Brief a statement made during 
closing argument is erroneously attributed to counsel for 
defendant Variable Annuity Life. The statement is correctly 
attributed to counsel for defendant Larry Anderson on page 57 
of the Brief. 
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argued as follows: 
Why didn't Jeep, having all of the test 
data of the plaintiff's experts, knowing 
exactly what they had done, even to the 
height of the outriggers off the ground; 
why didn't they go out and test a 
Commando, put some outriggers on there 
and to do some testing of their own? Why 
didn't they come in here and tell you, 
"We have done the same kind of tests that 
the plaintiffs did, we have put the same 
number of degrees of steer in on a 
Commando, and that vehicle wouldn't turn 
over; why didn't they do that? I'll tell 
you why: They are afraid to do it. They 
didn't dare do it. Because they knew 
that Commando would turn over. 
(T., 11/3/83, at 109; R. 4659). Similarly, counsel for 
plaintiffs argued to the jury that AMC/Jeep had "No positive 
proof. None at all," (ij3., at 32; R. 4582), that "They 
[AMC/Jeep] bring no evidence, none at all," (^ d., at 33; R. 
4583), and that AMC/Jeep's experts failed to bring "an ounce 
of engineering data." (Ij3., at 35; R. 4585). 
The rule stated in AMC/Jeep's opening Brief is that 
"a lawyer who has successfully urged the court to exclude 
evidence should not be allowed to point to the absence of 
that evidence to create an inference that it does not exist." 
State v. Dudley, 104 Idaho 849, 664 P.2d 277, 280 (Idaho App. 
1983) (quoting the American Bar Association Standards, The 
Defense Function, Section 7.8(a) (1971)). The "mischief" 
identified in Dudley is precisely the mischief engaged in by 
opposing counsel during their closing arguments. As this 
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Court has recently stated: "The proper remedy for prejudi-
cial attorney misconduct is to order a new trial." Nelson v. 
Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1982). 
Plaintiffs argue that "AMC/Jeep is precluded from 
now claiming reversible error as a result of counsel's clos-
ing argument by way of its failure to timely object to the 
alleged prejudicial statements." (Resp. Br. at 51). Plain-
tiffs fail to note the undeniable fact that AMC/Jeep stren-
uously objected to these statements and even moved for a 
mistrial because of them. (T., 11/3/83, at 193-197). It is 
of no moment that the objection was not made at the time the 
statements were made to the jury. As the court stated in 
Johnson v. Emerson, 103 Idaho 350, 647 P.2d 806, 810-811 
(Idaho App. 1982) : 
We do not interpret [the rule requiring 
timely objections] to require counsel to 
raise all objections instantly, during 
closing argument itself. Frequent objec-
tions during argument, even if proper, 
risk alienating the court and may serve 
only to emphasize objectionable comment 
for the jury.... Rather, we hold that if 
counsel elects to raise the alleged 
improprieties by a motion for mistrial or 
by other appropriate means, before the 
case is submitted to the jury, the issue 
will be preserved for appeal. 
AMC/Jeep objected to, and moved for a mistrial based on, the 
quoted comments as soon as closing arguments were concluded 
and the jury had left the courtroom. The objection was 
certainly timely and served to preserve the issue for this 
appeal. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING 
EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO 
UTILIZE AVAILABLE SEAT BELTS 
A* Three Members of this Court have 
Expressed a View Consistent with the 
Rule that a Plaintiff's Failure to 
Utilize Available Seat Belts Consti-
tutes a Failure to Mitigate Damages 
AMC/Jeep has presented the substantive arguments of 
the growing number of courts which allow juries to consider a 
plaintiff's failure to utilize seat belts in connection with 
the issue of contributory fault and the plaintiff's duty to 
mitigate his own damages. AMC/Jeep also contends that the 
jury should have been permitted to consider the fact that 
plaintiffs' Commando was equipped with seat belts when decid-
ing whether that Commando was defectively designed. (App. 
Br. at 59-68). 
Plaintiffs' response to AMC/Jeep's presentation of 
the so-called "seat belt defense" issue is flawed from the 
outset. At the very beginning of their argument, plaintiffs 
misstate that "[t]here exists no controlling or even helpful 
case law within this jurisdiction regarding the issue of 
admissibility of evidence related to the use of seat belts." 
(Resp. Br. at 53). Plaintiffs fail to note the concurring 
opinion of Justice Oaks (joined by Chief Justice Hall and 
Justice Durham) in Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, No. 18133; 
(Slip Opinion—May 1, 1984) (petition for rehearing filed). 
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The plaintiff in Acculog brought suit to recover 
damages suffered when his van was destroyed by fire. One of 
the issues at trial was whether the plaintiff's failure to 
carry a fire extinguisher in his van was relevant to either 
the issue of contributory negligence or the issue of mitiga-
tion of damages. The trial court avoided this issue on the 
ground that the parties had stipulated to the amount of 
damages. At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a 
special verdict but the trial court ruled that plaintiff had 
no cause of action. The plaintiff appealed and this court 
remanded for a new trial. In connection with the remandf 
Justice Oaks authored a concurring opinion in which he of-
fered "guidance" to the trial court on remand with respect to 
the issue of mitigation of damages. With the following 
statementf Justice Oaks embraced the arguments utilized by 
the courts that have adopted the "mitigation of damages" 
approach to the seat belt defense (see Pet. Br. at 61-66): 
[T]he amount of damages the plaintiff 
would be allowed to recover [after taking 
into account comparative negligence] is 
subjected to a further reduction dictated 
by the common-law rule of mitigation of 
damages or what the Restatement calls 
"the damages rule as to avoidable conse-
quences ...." Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, Section 465 comment c (1965). 
This reduction, on which the defendant 
has the burden of proof, applies where 
the plaintiff is found to have been 
negligent in failing to mitigate or avoid 
damages and where this negligence is 
found to have increased his total damages 
beyond what he would have suffered if he 
had not been negligent in this manner. 
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Slip. Op. at 7 (emphasis added). 
Justice Oaks clearly advocates the admissibility of 
evidence regarding non-use of available safety devices in his 
quotation of the following "well-reasoned" example propounded 
by the court in Halvorson v. Voeller, 336 N.W. 2d 118, 121-
122 n.2 (N.D. 1983): 
Assume: X driving a car, and Y driving a 
motorcycle, get in an accident. Y is not 
wearing a helmet. The jury finds X is 60 
percent liable for causing the accident 
[the "injury" under Section 78-27-37], 
making Y, the motorcyclist, 40 percent 
liable for causing the accident. The 
jury also finds Y would have avoided 60 
percent of his injuries [damages] if he 
had worn a helmet; X is 40 percent liable 
for causing Y's [damages]. Y proves 
$100,000 in damages. 
On the basis of these findings, the 
$100,000 award would be reduced by 40 
percent, which account for Y's contribut-
ing to the cause of the accident. Hence, 
the award is diminished to $60,000. 
The $60,000 should now be reduced to 
the extent that Y's [damages] would have 
been [avoided] had he worn a helmet, 
i.e., 60 percent. This adjustment leaves 
a total award of $24,000. 
Id., at 8 n.l. 
The issue before this Court does not involve any 
argument that plaintiffs caused their accident by failing to 
use their seat belts. Rather, AMC/Jeep's argument to this 
Court is found in the third paragraph quoted above; plain-
tiffs' damages should be reduced by the amount that their 
damages would have been "avoided" had they worn their seat 
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belts. Surely, if three members of this Court would consider 
non-use of a motorcycle helmet relevant to such an inquiry, 
evidence of non-use of the universally available seat belt is 
also relevant. 
This is precisely the view espoused by many courts 
that have permitted juries in product liability cases involv-
ing automobiles to consider a plaintiff's failure to utilize 
available seat belts in determining the plaintiff's damages. 
See Insurance Company of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 
2d 447, 454 (Fla. 1984); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y. 2d 444, 323 
N.E. 2d 164, 167 (1974). These cases, and Justice Oaks' 
opinion, are consistent with Prosser's indication that the 
plaintiff's duty to mitigate his damages is equivalent to the 
doctrine of avoidable consequence, which precludes recovery 
for any damages which could have been eliminated by reason-
able conduct on the part of the plaintiff. W. Prosser, 
Handbook of the Law of Torts Section 65, pp. 442-444 (4th Ed. 
1971). 
Although this concept has been applied most often 
to post-accident conduct, courts recognize that this does not 
preclude its application to pre-accident conduct. Plain-
tiffs' claim that "the duty to mitigate damages cannot arise 
before the plaintiff is damaged," (Resp. Br. at 62-66), 
exalts theory over common sense and sound policy. Evidence 
of a plaintiff's failure to utilize an available seat belt 
should be admitted because seat belts afford the automobile 
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occupant an unusually effective means by which a person "may 
minimize his or her injuries prior to an accident." Spier v. 
Barker, 323 N.E. 2d, at 168. The simple fact is that in many 
cases, as in this one, it can be demonstrated that the fail-
ure of a plaintiff to use an available seat belt exacerbated 
the plaintiff's injuries. See Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary 
Approach to Seat Belt Issues, 29 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 217, 231-
235 (1980). 
B. Plaintiffs' Knowledge, or Lack of 
Knowledge, With Respect to the Pres-
ence of Seat Belts in their Vehicle 
does not Bear on AMC/Jeep's Defense 
Based on Plaintiffs' Failure to Use 
their Seat Belts. 
Plaintiffs point out that AMC/Jeep was barred by 
the trial court from introducing evidence of plaintiffs' 
failure to use their seat belts because there was no showing 
that plaintiffs knew of the seat belts or that they made a 
conscious decision not to use them. (Resp. Br. at 54-56). 
The trial court's position, as well as plaintiffs' argument 
in this regard is not supported by either law or common 
sense. Even assuming that the location of the seat belts is 
relevant to plaintiffs' culpability in failing to use them, 
such facts only present a question for the jury to decide, 
not a basis for excluding from the jury's consideration the 
failure to use the belts. 
In any event, plaintiffs' awareness of the seat 
belts does not bear directly on the issue at hand. There is 
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no dispute that plaintiffs1 Commando was equipped with seat 
belts. It can hardly be the fault of AMC/Jeep that those 
seat belts "were under the seat" as alleged by plaintiffs. 
(Resp. Br. at page 56). Alsof whether or not plaintiffs made 
a "conscious decision" to eschew the use of their seat belts 
is not at issue here. Whether conscious or simply unwisef 
AMC/Jeep contendsf and the evidence would have shown, that 
plaintiffs' failure to use their seat belts contributed to 
their injuries. The amount that plaintiffs1 damages should 
have been reduced by reason of that failure is an issue for 
the jury to decide. The trial court erred in preempting this 
issue of fact. 
C. The Absence of a Statutory Obligation 
does not Preclude the Imposition of a 
Common Law Duty to Utilize Available 
Seat Belts. 
Plaintiffs next argue that "there exists no statu-
tory nor common law duty to utilize a seat belt." (Resp. Br. 
at 57-60). AMC/Jeep has never contended that there is a Utah 
or federal statute requiring one to utilize an available seat 
belt. But plaintiffs1 leap from that fact to the assertion 
that no duty exists at common law to utilize a seat belt is 
unsupported and unfounded. The absence of statutory obliga-
tions to use reasonable care and to mitigate damages has been 
no bar to the common law development of those doctrines. For 
example, the fact that there is no statutory obligation to 
wear a crash helmet when operating a motorcycle did not deter 
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Justice Oaks from stating that failure to wear a crash helmet 
would be relevant to the issue of mitigation or avoidance of 
damages. Acculog, supra, at 8 n.l. 
Plaintiffs argue that it is for the legislature, 
not the courts, to decide whether to "penalize a plaintiff 
for not using seat belts ...." (Resp. Br. at 59, quoting 
Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 610 P.2d 668 (Mont. 
1980); see also id., at 60-62). The Florida Supreme Court, 
in ruling that a jury should be allowed to consider evidence 
of a plaintiff's failure to use available seat belts, re-
sponded to this call for judicial restraint most convinc-
ingly: 
[The plaintiff] asserts that the single 
most compelling reason for such a holding 
[i.e., that the jury cannot consider the 
plaintiff's failure to use seat belts] is 
the principle that courts are law inter-
preting and not lawmaking and argues that 
we should not act in a peculiarly legis-
lative manner. 
We disagree and find this issue 
particularly appropriate for judicial 
decision. In the past, this Court has 
not abdicated its continuing respon-
sibility to the citizens of this state to 
ensure that the law remains both fair and 
realistic as society and technology 
change. ... 
To abstain from acting responsibly 
in the present case on the basis of 
legislative deference would be to con-
sciously ignore a limited area where 
decisions by the lower courts of this 
state have created an illogical exception 
to the doctrine of comparative negligence 
... and the underlying philosophy of 
individual responsibility .... 
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Insurance Company of North America v, Pasakarnis, supra, 451 
So. 2d, at 451. I 
Product liability law creates incentives for manu-
facturers to design and make safe products and thus promotes 
the goals of tort law by limiting the risk of harm. But loss { 
prevention and risk avoidance is not solely in the hands of 
manufacturers. Safety is a two-way street. Despite plain-
tiffs' charge that "the seat belt defense is inappropriate in \ 
the context of strict liability," (Resp. Br. at 69-70), the 
party in the best position to promote safety may be someone 
other than the manufacturer, such as the product user. 
In this case, the jury should have been permitted 
to consider whether and to what extent plaintiffs' failure to 
utilize available seat belts contributed to their damages. 
This is consistent with the Restatement's position that every 
person—product user, manufacturer, and retailer—has a duty 
to act reasonably by exercising "those qualities of atten-
tion, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which society 
requires of its members for the protection of their own 
interests and the interests of others." Restatement (Second) 
of Torts Section 283 comment b (1965) (emphasis added). This 
is the basis for tort rules relating to contributory fault, 
misuse, assumption of the risk, last clear chance, avoidable 
consequences, comparative causation, and mitigation of dam-
ages, all of which hold the plaintiff responsible for the 
consequences of failing to exercise reasonable care for his 
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own safety. These rules apply with equal force to product 
liability actions where "the user frequently can control the 
risk by avoiding foolish uses or by making use of some spe-
cific knowledge about significant alternatives that are in 
his or her control." Werber, supra, 29 Cleve. St. L. Rev, at 
225. See Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1303 
(Utah 1981), holding that it is proper for the jury to con-
sider the faults of both plaintiff and defendant when they 
"have united as concurrent proximate causes of an injury" in 
strict product liability cases. 
D. Plaintiffs Fail to Respond to 
AMC/Jeep's Argument that the Jury 
Should have been Permitted to Con-
sider the Fact that the Commando was 
Equipped with Seat Belts in Con-
nection with the Issue of Design 
Safety. 
As AMC/Jeep argued in its opening Brief, the pres-
ence of seat belts in the accident vehicle is also relevant, 
in a design defect case such as this, on the question whether 
the vehicle is inherently unsafe and unreasonably dangerous 
because the safety of a vehicle's design cannot be fairly 
evaluated if the fact finder is precluded from considering 
the principal safety features designed into the vehicle for 
the express purpose of providing protection to the occupants. 
This Court has recognized that "[s]trict liability 
in tort is not the equivalent of making the manufacturer or 
seller absolutely liable as an insurer of the product and its 
use." Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1302 
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(Utah 1981). Tort law does not require automobile manufac-
turers to make "accident proof" vehicles. Larsen v. General i 
Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 499 (8th Cir. 1968). Such a 
vehicle is impossible to make because accidents and colli-
sions are inevitable. Thus, a manufacturer's duty is only to i 
produce vehicles that are not unreasonably dangerous. See 
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 
1979) (adopting the language of Section 402A, Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, requiring the plaintiff in a strict prod-
uct liability action to prove that the product at issue was 
in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous to the 
ultimate consumer). 
Whether the manufacturer's duty has been met in a 
particular case cannot be determined in a vacuum simply by 
focusing on the allegedly defective aspect of the design. 
Manufacturers make design decisions with the whole vehicle in 
mind, balancing a wide range of considerations. The jury in 
a design defect case like this one must be given the same 
opportunity to consider the vehicle as a whole. Wilson v. 
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368, 1371 (E.D. 
Va. 1978); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 144 
Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162, 1174-1175 (1978). 
In evaluating whether a vehicle's design taken as a 
whole is reasonably safe, many factors are relevant. See 
Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 
Vand. L. Rev. 551 (1980). The size and style of the vehicle, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
its price, and its intended uses are all pertinent. A person 
who purchases a convertible car cannot expect the kind of 
protection that he would have in a hard top and the courts do 
not impose a duty on the manufacturer to design a convertible 
car which meets the same safety standards. Dreisonstok v. 
Wolkswagenwerk A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1072-1075 (4th Cir. 
1974); Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 808, 811-812 
(10th Cir. 1981). 
Consideration must also be given to the safety 
features inherent in the design of the vehicle in question. 
E.g., Wilson, supra, 445 F. Supp., at 1371; Daly, supra, 575 
P.2d, at 1174. Cases alleging harm caused by a defect in 
design, regardless of the aspect of the product impugned, 
always raise questions about whether, through safety features 
designed into the vehicle, the manufacturer met its duty to 
design a vehicle that provides reasonable protection against 
foreseeable risks of harm. 
Seat belts are placed in vehicles for the express 
purpose of reducing the risk of injury to vehicle occupants. 
This was as true of the seat belts in plaintiffs' Commando as 
it is in the case of all modern vehicles. It is neither 
feasible nor fair to determine whether a vehicle is unreason-
ably dangerous without considering the presence of seat 
belts, the specific purpose and effect of which are to meet 
the manufacturer's duty to reduce unreasonable risks of 
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injury. See Werber, supra, 29 Cleve. St. L. Rev., at 253-
254. 
The jury's consideration of the whole vehicle in a 
design defect case like this one is particularly appropriate 
in Utah. In Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 
P.2d 152 (Utah 1979), this Court adopted the standard of 
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 
402A provides, in pertinent part, that "[o]ne who sells any 
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to 
the user of consumer ... is subject to liability for physical 
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user ...." (Emphasis 
added). Many courts and commentators have noted that in 
design defect, as opposed to manufacturing defect, cases the 
"unreasonably dangerous" language of Section 402A assumes 
particular relevance: 
[0]ur experience teaches us that, in the 
conscious design choice cases, where 
there is no other (available) standard, 
excision of the unreasonably dangerous 
concept denudes Section 402A of its only 
vehicle for infusing into the notion of 
"defect" a meaningful guide to its deter-
mination. Dean Wade has written that in 
(conscious) design defect cases, the 
concept of defective condition standing 
alone is inappropriate, and that it has 
no independent meaning and is apt to 
prove misleading. Wade, Strict Tort 
Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 
15 (1965). Accord, Ross v. Up-Right, 
INc, 402 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1968). We 
agree. Professor Keeton believes that, 
in the area of design problem "defective" 
means unreasonably dangerous. Keeton, 
Product Liability and the Meaning of 
Defect, 5 St. Mary's L.J. 30, 32 (1973). 
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Bowman v, General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 242 (E.D. 
Pa. 1977) (applying Pennsylvania law). 
Thus, in deciding whether plaintiffs1 Commando was 
defectively designed, as asserted by plaintiffs, the jury was 
required to decide whether the Commando was unreasonably 
dangerous. As the court stated in an analogous case, evi-
dence that an accident vehicle had been equipped with seat 
belts should be admitted for the purpose of determining 
whether the vehicle was defectively designed because the jury 
must determine "whether the auto as a whole was defective and 
unreasonably dangerous ...." Wilson v. Volkswagen of 
America, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368, 1371 (E.D. Va. 1978). It 
is simply impossible to consider individual design decisions 
in a vacuum because such decisions are made as part of a 
myriad of design decisions that go into the manufacture of 
the whole vehicle. 
Plaintiffs would have it that their presentation of 
but one aspect of the Commando, the strength of its roof when 
subjected to a roll over, is enough to show that the Commando 
was defective. This precise argument was rejected by the 
California Supreme Court in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 144 
Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978). The plaintiffs in that 
case sued the defendant manufacturer for damages suffered as 
the result of an automobile accident. The plaintiffs' theory 
against the manufacturer was that a door latch had been 
improperly designed. At trial, and over the plaintiffs' 
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objections, the defendant was permitted to introduce evidence 
that the accident vehicle was equipped with a seat belt-
shoulder harness system, and a door lock, either of which if 
used would have prevented the injury complained of. The 
plaintiffs1 lost at trial and, on appeal, challenged a jury 
instruction which directed that "'[i]n determining whether or 
not the vehicle was defective you should consider all of the 
equipment on the vehicle including any features intended for 
the safety of the driver.1" 575 P.2d, at 1174. It was the 
plaintiffs1 contention, as plaintiffs contend here, "that 
only the precise malfunctioning component itself, and alone, 
may be considered in determining whether injury was caused by 
a defectively designed product." _Ld. The California Supreme 
Court disagreed with the plaintiffs1 contention, stating as 
follows: 
The jury could properly determine whether 
the [accident vehicle's] overall design, 
including safety features provided in the 
vehicle, made it 'crashworthy,' thus 
rendering the vehicle nondefective. 
Product designs do not evolve in a 
vacuum, but must reflect the realities of 
the market place, kitchen, highway, and 
shop. Similarly, a product's components 
are not developed in isolation, but as 
part of an integrated and interrelated 
whole. Recognizing that finished prod-
ucts must incorporate and balance safety, 
utility, competitive merit, and prac-
ticality under a multitude of intended 
and foreseeable uses, courts have 
struggled to evolve realistic tests for 
defective design which give weight to 
this necessary balancing. ... However 
phrased, these decisions emphasize the 
need to consider the product as an in-
tegrated whole. 
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Id., at 1175. See also McElroy v. Allstate Insurance Co., 
420 So. 2d 214 (La. App. 1982). 
In this case, the Commando's roof, or even its roll 
over characteristics, are no more important a part of the 
vehicle than are its steering column, interior padding, door 
locks, suspension and seat belts. The trial court's exclu-
sion of any evidence relating to seat belts is no more logi-
cal than the exclusion of any other safety device that 
AMC/Jeep had designed into the Commando. In fact, the trial 
court's exclusion of AMC/Jeep's seat belt evidence is par-
ticularly incongruous because that evidence would have shown 
that, if utilized, the seat belts would have prevented pre-
cisely the type of injury complained of by plaintiff Steven 
Whitehead. (T., 10/31/83, at 2018; R. 3806). In effect, the 
trial court barred the jury from considering the most criti-
cal safety feature designed into the Commando by AMC/Jeep. 
This Court should hold that evidence of the pres-
ence of seat belts should be admitted on the issue of design 
defect in this case. Admitting this evidence is a simple 
matter of fairness. It will merely allow the jury to con-
sider evidence regarding the capacity of seat belts to pre-
vent and reduce injuries, along with all other relevant 
evidence, in determining whether the vehicle, taken as a 
whole, is defective and unreasonably dangerous as plaintiffs 
allege. 
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E. The Trier of Fact is Capable of 
Understanding and Applying Rationally 
the "Seat Belt Defense" 
Plaintiffs assert that evidence with respect to 
seat belts and their relationship to a plaintiff's injury "is 
simply too speculative to be placed in issue before a jury." 
(Resp. Br. at 67-68). A jury's task in deciding whether, and 
to what extent, a plaintiff's failure to utilize available 
seat belt contributed to his injury, however, is hardly more 
difficult than comparative causation principles applied 
regularly by Utah juries under Utah's comparative negligence 
statute. As this Court said recently, in holding that these 
comparative principles are applicable in strict liability 
actions, "we believe that judges and juries will have little 
difficulty assigning the relative responsibility each is to 
bear for a particular injury when the ultimate issues in such 
comparisons are relative fault and relative causation." 
Mulherin, supra, 628 P.2d, at 1304. A jury is capable of 
weighing seat belt evidence in any tort action, and this case 
should be remanded for a new trial so that a jury can con-
sider the evidence proffered by AMC/Jeep. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
DIRECT A VERDICT BASED ON AMC/JEEP7^ 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE 
AMC/Jeep has detailed the trial court's erroneous 
decision to ignore AMC/Jeep's defense based on the statute of 
limitations found in Utah's Product Liability Act, Section 
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78-15-3, Utah Code Annotated, (App. Br. at 68-74). As 
plaintiffs admit, the statute of limitations defense was 
already before the trial court in the answer of defendant 
American Motors Sales Corporation. (R. 84-87). That answer 
was filed without objection. At the same time American 
Motors Sales Corporation filed its answer, defendant Jeep 
Corporation filed a motion for leave to amend its answer, 
filed previously, to bring it into accord with the answer of 
American Motors Sales Corporation. (R. 983-989). 
Conceding that AMC/Jeep would have a valid defense 
based on the statute's six year limitations provision, (see 
Resp. Br. at 73), plaintiffs respond to AMC/Jeep's claim of 
error by arguing that the trial court was justified in deny-
ing Jeep Corporation's motion to amend its answer on the 
grounds that the amended answer would have delayed trial and 
would have required "extensive discovery on behalf of the 
plaintiff." (Resp. Br. at 77). Plaintiffs rely on Staker v. 
Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 
1983), for their argument that such amendments to pleadings 
are rarely permitted at the commencement of or during trial. 
Totally ignored by plaintiffs, however, is the glaring fact 
which distinguishes this case from Staker and renders plain-
tiffs1 arguments inapposite: The statute of limitations 
issue was already properly before the trial court in the 
answer of American Motors Sales Corporation. The prejudice 
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that plaintiffs claim would have resulted had Jeep Corpo-
ration's motion to amend been granted simply disappears in 
light of the fact that plaintiffs had to contend with 
AMC/Jeep's defense based on the statute of limitations in any 
event. Under these unique circumstances, Rule 15(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, should have guided the trial court 
and leave to amend should have been granted in the interests 
of justice. 
Plaintiffs also argue that AMC/Jeep "made abso-
lutely no proffer of proof related to the Product Liability 
Act or statute of limitations during the entire course of 
trial; therefore, the issue is waived." (Resp. Br. at 74). 
The facts critical to this defense were undisputed, however, 
and the trial court did not rely on any such argument in 
denying AMC/Jeepfs motion for directed verdict based on the 
statute of limitations. The motion was denied by the trial 
court without comment. (T., 11/4/83, at 18-19; R. 4774-
4775). The trial court's failure to direct a verdict on this 
ground was erroneous and the trial court's judgment should 
therefore be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's judgment on the verdict cannot be 
sustained and must be reversed and a new trial or the entry 
of judgment for AMC/Jeep ordered for the six independently 
sufficient reasons detailed in AMC/Jeep's Brief. Plaintiffs' 
Brief fails to address many of the significant issues raised 
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by AMC/Jeep. The arguments to which plaintiffs have re-
sponded are not explained away or even blunted by plaintiffs' 
Brief. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, and for the 
reasons stated in AMC/Jeepfs Brief, the judgment on the 
verdict must be reversed and a new trial or the entry of 
judgment for AMC/Jeep ordered. 
, At 
DATED this ^ day of October, 1984. 2. 
ROOKER, LARSEN, KIMBALL & PARR 
Thomas B. Green 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Appellants American Motors 
Sales Corporation and 
Jeep Corporation 
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